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Sherry Colb’s and Michael Dorf’s provocative and insightful 
new book grew out of a pair of observations: (i) Many animal 
rights activists are categorically opposed to killing animals (i.e., 
mammals, birds, fish, and shell fish) for food, sport, or science, 
but favor the right to abortion, a practice that involves the 
deliberate killing of a human organism. (ii) Many “Pro-Life” 
advocates are categorically opposed to the destruction of even 
a single-cell human zygote, but have no qualms about dining 
on the bodies of fully developed, conscious sentient animals 
“whose lives were filled with unspeakable suffering, ended 
only by horrific deaths” (1). Is either of these stances tenable? 
Or, are both groups guilty of a kind of moral blindness when it 
comes to the moral status of certain individuals? With this as 
its starting point, the book explores the various ways in which 
the abortion debate and the animal rights debate interconnect 
(and sometime diverge) and the ways these debates mutually 
inform each other—an exploration that proves fruitful both 
philosophically and practically. Anyone new to either debate 
would benefit from reading this lively and provocative book. 
The book is clearly written and engaging throughout and 
would make an exceptionally useful supplemental text for any 
contemporary moral issues course that includes sections on 
abortion and animal ethics. Indeed, I plan on using it the next 
time I teach contemporary moral issues. 
When reviewing a book, it is important to evaluate it on its 
own terms. Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal Rights is not 
aimed at professional scholars seasoned in the subtle nuances 
both debates. It is aimed at laypersons of good faith, who are 
relatively new to one or both debates. As such, the book does 
not pretend to be the final word on either issue; rather, it is an 
invitation and an opportunity to think seriously and critically 
about both. By looking at these two debates side-by-side, Colb 
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and Dorf  “mean to provoke thought even if [they] do not 
change minds” (2), though given the strength of some of their 
arguments, I suspect some minds will be changed. The book 
has two parts. Part 1 focuses on the ethical and legal issues 
surrounding abortion and the instrumental use of animals in 
agriculture and science. Part 2 focuses on strategies and tactics 
that activists in each movement might employ to win over the 
hearts and minds of those yet unconvinced. Rather than attempt 
to catalog the content of the book chapter by chapter, my aim in 
this review article is to engage critically with the book’s central 
arguments and principal theses to highlight the richness of the 
book. Let’s begin.
Part 1. The Ethics and Legality of Abortion and 
Animal Use 
The book addresses and answers two fundamental moral 
questions:
Q1. “When, if ever, is it morally permissible for humans 
to use or kill animals?” (11) 
Q2. “Under what circumstances, if any, is abortion 
morally permissible?” (11) 
The book also explores the following legal/political question:
Q3. “To what extent should a democracy allocate 
these matters to individual conscience rather than to 
collective decision making through law?” (11)
Colb and Dorf answer these questions as follows:
A1. Killing animals for food and using them as experimental 
subjects is almost always seriously morally wrong. As such, we 
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should refuse to support such practices and embrace a vegan 
lifestyle instead.
A2. Aborting pre-sentient fetuses raises no moral concerns at 
all. Aborting sentient fetuses harms those fetuses and is prima 
facie wrong (i.e., wrong in the absence of overriding reasons 
that justify inflicting that harm). Despite the presumptive 
wrongness of aborting sentient fetuses, some such abortions 
may still be permissible, provided the woman has morally 
weighty enough reasons to justify the harm imposed on the 
fetus.
A3. Even when abortions are immoral, they should still 
be legal. Similarly, even though killing animals for food is 
morally wrong, it should remain legal given the current context 
in which we live.
So, how do they defend these claims? First, they argue that 
sentience – the ability to suffer – is sufficient not only for moral 
considerability but also for possessing moral rights, including 
the right not to be harmed and the right not to be killed. As 
they see it, sentient beings have interests and the corresponding 
moral rights needed to protect those interests. The idea that 
sentience is sufficient for moral considerability is relatively 
uncontroversial in the philosophical literature on animal ethics. 
The claim that sentience is sufficient for possessing moral rights 
is more contentious. Indeed, many people insist that in order 
to have moral rights, a being must be rational. But, as I have 
argued elsewhere (2016b), such a view is implausible for at least 
two reasons: First, many humans, e.g., infants, young children, 
and the mentally infirm, lack rationality, but these humans still 
possess the right not to be harmed. Second, when identifying 
a rights-conferring property, “the property picked must have 
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some plausible rationale. There must be some reason for 
thinking that possessing the property in question is necessary 
and sufficient for possessing [the right in question]” (Engel 
2016b, 46). Since the non-rational humans mentioned above 
have a right not to be harmed, being rational is not necessary 
for possessing the right not to be harmed. Rationality also is 
not sufficient for possessing the right not to be harmed, a point 
that, to my knowledge, has been totally overlooked. To see that 
the argument: “X is rational; therefore, X has a right not to be 
harmed” is a non sequitur, we need only imagine a rational 
being without the capacity to be harmed (perhaps, God is such 
a being). No being that lacks the capacity to be harmed has 
the right not to be harmed. In light of these observations, it is 
much more plausible to think that the right not to be harmed is 
rooted in the capacity to be harmed. So, here, I side with Colb 
and Dorf. If moral rights exist, then the right not to be harmed 
is grounded in the capacity to be harmed. Since sentient beings 
are harmed when they are caused to suffer, sentient beings 
have a right not to be harmed. More controversial still is their 
claim that sentience can ground the right not to be killed. But, 
here again, I side with Colb and Dorf. It is plausible to think 
that sentient beings with a life worth living are harmed by 
premature death, and if so, then the sentience-based right not 
to be harmed entails the right not to be killed.
Though Colb and Dorf don’t say so explicitly, it seems clear 
that they don’t take these rights to be absolutely inviolable 
rights; rather they treat them as prime facie rights – rights 
that morally constrain us unless there are sufficiently weighty 
countervailing considerations that override them. As they put 
it: “Absent some very strong justification or excuse, we have a 
[moral] duty to avoid intentionally inflicting suffering or death 
on any sentient being, whether human or nonhuman” (13). 
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When it comes to raising and killing animals for food, there 
are no such countervailing considerations. Since we can easily 
meet all of our nutritional needs, and can actually meet them 
better, with plant-based foods (45-48) and since we can easily 
satisfy our desire for tasty food with delicious plant-based 
meals (52-53), they conclude, there is no good reason to subject 
animals to the horrors of factory farming nor is there a good 
reason to kill animals for food. Since we all agree that it is 
wrong to harm animals or cause them to suffer or kill them for 
no good reason, our own beliefs commit us to the immorality 
of raising and killing animals for food.1 Their argument for 
ethical veganism is extremely compelling.
Since, on their view, sentient fetuses also have the right not 
to be harmed and the right not to be killed, Colb and Dorf con-
tend that aborting sentient fetuses is morally wrong unless the 
pregnant woman has some very strong moral justification for 
doing so. What about pre-sentient fetuses? As noted above, 
Colb and Dorf argue that aborting pre-sentient fetuses raises 
no moral concerns at all. They offer two independent reasons 
for this conclusion. Let’s consider and assess each of these 
reasons in turn. Their first reason for thinking that aborting 
pre-sentient fetuses is morally benign is that pre-sentient fe-
tuses cannot be harmed. Lacking consciousness, pre-sentient 
fetuses are, in their view, “somethings, not someones” (44). A 
pre-sentient fetus cannot be harmed, they argue, because, prior 
to sentience, there is no someone to be harmed.
Is it really the case that pre-sentient fetuses cannot be 
harmed? Colb and Dorf agree that grinding up live baby chicks 
harms them, because it deprives them of a future life worth liv-
ing. (111) But killing a normal healthy pre-sentient fetus like-
wise deprives that fetus of a future life worth living. If being 
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deprived of a future life worth living harms chicks, it’s hard 
to see why it doesn’t also harm a healthy pre-sentient fetus. 
To prevent this discussion from devolving into a mere clash of 
intuitions, let’s consider our commonsense understanding of 
harm. To harm an entity is to make that entity worse off than it 
otherwise would have been.
Harm: For any X, action A harms X if and only if 
action A makes X worse off than X otherwise would 
have been, had A not occurred.
It follows from Harm that not all deaths are harms. The death 
of a terminally ill, incurable cancer patient wracked with pain 
is not a harm. Every additional day such a person lives makes 
her/him worse off. Death, in such cases, is a relief, a benefit.
We can use this general account of harm to explain when 
death harms an animal:
Harmful Death: Death harms an animal to the extent 
that it results in that animal’s life containing less net 
well-being than it would otherwise have contained.
Aborting a normal healthy pre-sentient fetus that would 
have had a life worth living results in that organism having 
considerably less net well-being than it would have had if al-
lowed to live.
 Conversely, carrying to healthy normal pre-sentient 
fetus to term would bestow a benefit2—that organism would 
be better off than it would have been had it been aborted. Any 
case where being born would confer a benefit is a case where 
being aborted would constitute a harm. If being born would 
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make the fetus better off, then being aborted would make the 
fetus worse off.
Independent of such conceptual analysis, it’s worth noting 
that most of us commonly think that pre-sentient fetuses can 
be harmed. A pregnant woman who drinks excessive amounts 
of alcohol every day of the first trimester of her pregnancy (and 
then stops all alcohol consumption) harms her fetus by poison-
ing the fetus. When the baby is subsequently born with severe 
fetal alcohol syndrome as a result of her first trimester drink-
ing, it is clear that the pregnant woman harmed the fetus, and 
it is also clear that the harm took place prior to fetal sentience. 
It would be strange, indeed, to say that the harm did not take 
place at the time of the drinking, but rather took place months 
later after the fetus became sentient, since the damage to the 
fetus was done at the time of the drinking.
The second reason Colb and Dorf offer for thinking that 
aborting pre-sentient fetuses is morally benign rests on the dis-
tinction between negative and positive duties. Negative duties 
are duties to do no harm. Positive duties are duties to provide 
some benefit or affirmative assistance. Colb and Dorf draw 
on the act/omission distinction to argue that we have a strong 
negative duty to refrain from harming any being capable of 
being harmed (it is clearly wrong to actively harm another be-
ing), but, they insist, we have no positive duties to assist others 
(failing to confer a benefit is perfectly permissible)—unless we 
acquire those positive duties by voluntarily entering into cer-
tain kinds of relationships or agreements. Since they think that 
pre-sentient fetuses cannot be harmed (for reasons discussed 
above), they contend that aborting such fetuses is just a failure 
to provide the fetus the benefit of being born. Since they think 
we have no positive duty to benefit others, they conclude that a 
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pregnant woman has no duty to benefit a pre-sentient fetus by 
bringing that fetus to term. (110)
 The supposed moral distinction between actions and 
omissions does not hold up well to philosophical scrutiny. Con-
sider Peter Singer’s famous pond example: On my way to give 
a lecture, I notice that a small child has fallen into the campus 
pond and is in danger of drowning. If I wade in and save the 
child, I may ruin my shoes and pants, and I may have to delay 
my lecture. “Would anyone deny that I ought to wade in and 
pull the child out?” (Singer 2011, 199).
As I understand them, Colb and Dorf think that my wading 
in to save the child would be an act of superegoration. Saving 
the child, though an incredibly good thing to do, is not morally 
required. Usually, it is only utilitarians that have to bite such 
large bullets. My take on the pond example (and the take of 
most others I’ve encountered) is that it would be profoundly 
morally wrong of me to let the child drown, and if that’s right, 
then we do have positive duties to assist others in addition to 
negative duties to do them no harm. Moreover, my positive 
duty to save the drowning child becomes even stronger, if I am 
the only person who can do so.
If, as I argued above, pre-sentient fetuses can be harmed by 
their deaths and if the capacity to be harmed in a certain way 
confers a right not to be harmed in that way, then pre-sentient 
fetuses, like their sentient counterparts, have a prima facie 
right not to be killed. Even so, it wouldn’t follow that abort-
ing them is always wrong because prima facie rights are over-
ridable—the woman might have an overriding reason morally 
weighty enough to justify the abortion. But it would follow that 
aborting pre-sentient fetuses is wrong absent such a reason.
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Regardless whether or not pre-sentient fetuses have the 
capacity to be harmed and the corresponding right not to be 
harmed, sentient fetuses clearly do have this capacity and cor-
responding right. As noted above, Colb and Dorf hold that “Ab-
sent some very strong justification or excuse, we have a [moral] 
duty to avoid intentionally inflicting suffering or death on any 
sentient being, whether human or nonhuman” (13). Unfortu-
nately, we are never told what sorts of reasons would be mor-
ally weighty enough to justify aborting a sentient fetus, but that 
is precisely what we need to know to assess the moral status 
of such abortions. Is the desire to not be pregnant a weighty 
enough reason to justify killing a sentient being with a right 
to life? Is the desire for a child of a different sex a sufficiently 
weighty reason to terminate a sentient fetus? I suspect that 
their answers would be “Yes” and “No,” respectively, because 
they think that a “woman has the right to end the internal occu-
pation of her body” (89), but don’t think that “she has the right 
to discover whether her fetus is male or female” (89). 
As noted at the outset, Colb and Dorf maintain that some 
abortions are clearly immoral, but argue that the woman should 
still have a legal right to have an abortion even when the abor-
tion is immoral. They think the decision of whether or not to 
have an abortion should always be left up to the mother. Given 
current laws in the U.S., it is up to the pregnant woman whether 
or not to have an abortion (at least within a certain timeframe),3 
but it is not up to the woman whether or not the abortion is 
morally permissible. Morality doesn’t vary from individual to 
individual. So, it would have been very helpful (and particu-
larly helpful for women wishing to do what is morally right) to 
know when an abortion is immoral and when it is not. In short, 
their discussion of the moral status of abortion would have 
benefitted considerably from a more detailed discussion of the 
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kinds of maternal considerations that do legitimately override 
the fetus’s right not to be harmed and the kinds of maternal 
considerations that don’t.
In places, they seem to suggest that wanting to not be in 
reproductive servitude is a sufficiently good reason to kill the 
fetus.4 They view any unwanted pregnancy “as an inherently 
parasitic experience in which one being takes a tremendous 
amount, in an intimate way, from the other” (66).5 Given the 
parasitic nature of pregnancy, they argue that no woman should 
ever be legally required to provide such reproductive service. 
Consequently, they oppose anti-abortion laws on the grounds 
that such good Samaritan laws would have the effect of forcing 
women to remain in nonconsensual reproductive servitude.6 I 
agree that there are compelling reasons not to enact such good 
Samaritan laws, but let’s stay focused on the moral status of 
aborting sentient fetuses.
Any reasonable person must agree that an unwanted preg-
nancy places a severe burden on a woman who desires to be 
free of such reproductive servitude.7 The moral question we 
need to address is this: Does the desire to free oneself of re-
productive servitude provide a moral reason weighty enough 
to justify killing a sentient fetus with a right not to be harmed? 
Rather than trying to answer this question directly, it might be 
useful to consider three less invasive forms of reproductive-
related servitude.
Case 1: Suppose a woman gives birth to a healthy child in an 
environment where the only source of food for the child is her 
own breast milk. If she doesn’t breastfeed the child, the child 
will die. In such a situation, is the woman morally required 
to breastfeed the child, or can she free herself from being in 
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nutritional servitude by letting the one-day-old child starve to 
death? It seems to me that it would be wrong for her to let the 
child starve to death just to be free of the burden of having to 
breastfeed the child. Compare Case 1 to Case 2: One could feed 
the child, but only by purchasing store bought formula. Surely, 
it would be wrong to let a child starve to death just to avoid the 
expense of having to purchase baby formula. There are differ-
ences between the cases to be sure. Breastfeeding places extra 
physical demands on a woman’s body and requires a kind of 
intimacy not required by feeding a baby formula from a bottle, 
but are these differences great enough to justify the mother in 
letting the sentient baby starve to death in Case 1 but not in 
Case 2?    
Case 3: While it is true that only women can be subject to 
the kind of reproductive servitude required by pregnancy, men 
can be and routinely are legally conscripted into another kind 
of reproductive-related servitude. The father of a single moth-
er’s child is legally required pay child support for the first 18 
years of that child’s life, whether he interacts with the child or 
not. Suppose he simply doesn’t want to be in that kind of in-
voluntary financial servitude for 18 years. Would it be morally 
permissible for him to kill the one-day-old sentient infant to 
free himself from such servitude? Surely not! If it is wrong for 
a man to kill an unwanted sentient newborn child to avoid 18 
years of involuntary financial servitude, but permissible for a 
woman to kill an unwanted sentient fetus to avoid the remain-
ing four months of reproductive servitude, there must be a mor-
ally relevant difference between these two kinds of servitude. 
Note, I’m not claiming that no such difference exists; I’m just 
asking those who claim that the desire to be free from repro-
ductive servitude justifies killing a sentient fetus to identify 
what that relevant difference is. Note also, I’m not denying that 
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there can be reasons sufficiently weighty to justify aborting a 
sentient fetus—threat to the life of the mother is clearly such 
a reason. I’m just inquiring as to whether the desire to avoid 
reproductive servitude is such a reason. 
Part 2. Strategy, Tactics, and Methods
a. Welfarism vs. Abolitionism
Assuming, as Colb, Dorf, and I do, that the ultimate ethi-
cal goal is to bring an end to all animal exploitation in agri-
culture and science, should animal rights activists and animal 
rights organizations (broadly construed) work, at least in part, 
to improve the welfare of the billions of animals currently be-
ing exploited in the most grotesque, horrific ways, or should 
they only support approaches that get the abolitionist seal of 
approval, such as vegan education campaigns?
Colb and Dorf offer a largely a priori argument for favor-
ing the abolitionist approach that I can’t rehearse here. While 
I don’t have space to do this hotly contested intra-movement 
debate justice here, I do want to stress that the issue is an em-
pirical one. We need empirical research to determine the most 
effective ways to eliminate animal exploitation, and that re-
search simply hasn’t been done yet (though Animal Charity 
Evaluators is currently in the process of identifying the animal 
charities that are most effective at reducing the number of ani-
mals being exploited). Rather than offer my own unsupported 
a priori speculations concerning this debate, let me make a 
couple of ecumenical observations and suggestions. The first 
thing to note about the debate over welfarism vs. abolitionism 
is that the two approaches are neither mutually exclusive nor 
exhaustive. Many organizations work to further both aims, 
i.e., they work to improve animal welfare while also engaging 
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in abolitionist campaigns like vegan education and outreach. 
There can also be hybrid approaches like abolition-aimed in-
crementalism. Critics of welfarism often cite the worst forms of 
welfarism to make their abolitionist case. When a welfarist or-
ganization works with the animal agriculture industry to pro-
mote some inconsequential change and then, in turn, helps to 
promote the sale of animal products so produced, that organi-
zation betrays the animals it has pledged to protect. But an ab-
olition-aimed incrementalist organization can work with state 
and federal legislatures (not the industry) to pass laws that ban 
and criminalize all forms of unanesthetized mutilation. It can 
work with legislatures to completely ban gestation crates and 
battery cages. It can work to bring an end to government subsi-
dies that artificially lower the cost of meat and animal products. 
When such an organization achieves such goals, it should never 
endorse the new “product” as “humane” because the industry 
is inherently inhumane. Instead, that organization should im-
mediately start working with the legislature to pass the next 
reform. Each of the reforms I’m envisioning will raise the cost 
of producing meat and animal products, and these higher prices 
will reduce demand, which, in turn, will reduce the number of 
animals being unjustly exploited. That’s not armchair philoso-
phy. It’s simple economics.
b. Graphic Images
Should animal rights activists use graphic images in an ef-
fort to convince others to adopt vegan lifestyles? While Colb 
and Dorf acknowledge that “exposing people to the violence 
that they solicit with their choices as consumers is morally ap-
propriate and perhaps even beneficial given our natural psy-
chological processes for inhibiting violence” (161, emphasis 
mine), they are nevertheless generally opposed to showing 
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graphic images and videos of the violence inherent in raising 
animals for food—on tactical grounds. Colb and Dorf worry 
that forcing people to confront the violence they support with 
their purchases can desensitize those people to animal suffer-
ing. 
Is the use of graphic images and videos an effective way 
to convince others to adopt vegan lifestyles? Or, does expos-
ing people to graphic videos simply desensitize them to animal 
suffering? Once again these are empirical questions. One piece 
of relevant empirical data comes from the Farm Animal Rights 
Movement [FARM]. Each year FARM conducts its “10 Bil-
lion Lives” tour to call attention to the 10 billion land animals 
slaughtered annually in the U.S. alone. The tour bus travels to 
college campuses and music festivals, and activists pay stu-
dents and festival-goers $1.00 to watch their graphic four-min-
ute 10 Billion Lives Video, which accurately depicts the brutal 
treatment routinely inflicted on farmed animals. FARM then 
follows up with these viewers via email. According to the 10 
Billion Lives Tour website, 80% of the viewers of their video 
commit to eating fewer animal products. If this self-reported 
number is accurate, then exposing people to graphic images 
and videos does seem to be an effective way of convincing 
people to eat fewer animal products. That said, as an educator, 
I’m more concerned about effective pedagogy in the classroom 
than I am about “activist tactics” in the street. 
There are a number of reasons why I think it important to 
supplement philosophical articles and moral arguments with 
graphic images and videos of the violence students are sup-
porting when they consume meat and animal products. Such 
images enrich student understanding of the degree of suffer-
ing inflicted on animals. As Kathie Jenni astutely observes: 
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“We’re troubled by suffering that we learn of through prose 
and statistics; but our unease remains vague, sporadic, and 
practically inert. We respond in dramatically different ways to 
suffering we see” (2005, 1). To morally respond to a problem, 
one must believe that the problem is real. When students read 
graphic descriptions of the cruelty and suffering inherent in 
factory farming, they tend to dismiss the accounts as “activist 
exaggerations.” They simply can’t believe that farmers would 
actually treat their animals in the ways described. What would 
normally count as a reason, i.e., an accurate written description 
of animal treatment, loses its epistemic force in the presence of 
the “exaggeration” defeater. Showing students graphic images 
and undercover videos that demonstrate that the written de-
scriptions they read are accurate serves to rebut the “exaggera-
tion” defeater and restore the original reason. As Jenni puts it, 
graphic visual presentations “make skepticism and avoidance 
temporarily less possible. Presented with detailed images of 
factory farms, the student who dismissed horror stories as ac-
tivists’ exaggerations is forced to acknowledge the neglect and 
brutality that she had heard of as real” (2005, 2). So, one reason 
that judicious classroom use of graphic videos is important is 
because of its epistemic value: “Seeing is believing.” 
Graphic visual presentations also play an important role in 
moral motivation. Nearly every semester that I teach contem-
porary moral issues, I have encounters of the following sort: 
After reading and discussing Singer’s arguments for ethical 
vegetarianism, some students will come up to me after class 
and say, “Singer has convinced me. I agree that eating meat is 
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The next class period, these same students meet their meat 
when I show a ten-minute Mercy for Animals video [“What 
Cody Saw”] that documents the harsh realities of animal agri-
culture. After viewing this video, many of these same students 
come up to me after class and say, “I had no idea it was so 
bad. I’m never eating meat again. Thank you for showing that 
video!” What changed? On day one, they merely believed that 
eating meat was wrong. They had what I call “thin knowledge” 
of wrongness of eating meat—a vague conviction that eating 
meat is wrong, but they did not fully understand, appreciate, 
or grasp that wrongness. They suffered from what Shelly Ka-
gan (1989) calls “paleness of belief”: a condition in which their 
beliefs were not fully absorbed, or did not fully register with 
them. On day two, these students not only believed that eating 
meat is wrong, they felt and fully appreciated that eating meat 
is wrong. They acquired “thick knowledge”—a fully integrat-
ed understanding and emotional awareness of the wrongness 
of eating meat. 
I see it play out every semester: Graphic images and videos 
serve as a corrective for “pale” belief. What was “pale” be-
comes “vivid.” Again, Jenni: “When we see that ‘inhumane 
slaughter’ entails the struggles of exhausted pigs to escape 
workers who kick them, beat them, and cut them apart while 
they are conscious, abstract knowledge becomes richly in-
formed and emotionally powerful awareness” (2005, 3-4). As a 
philosophy professor, it is not my place to tell students what to 
believe, but it is my responsibility to provide students with the 
information needed to make their own fully informed moral 
decisions, and I have repeatedly found that the judicious use 
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c. Violence
One of the greatest virtues of their book is that Colb and 
Dorf never shy away from controversial topics. One such topic 
is “Violence.” Should animal rights activists use violence to 
help reduce the number of animal rights violations? 
The first thing to note when answering this question, as 
Colb and Dorf do note, is that we do think that some atroci-
ties are so heinous that violence is justified to bring them to an 
end. When the Nazis embarked on their genocidal project and 
began implementing the so-called “final solution,” the Nazis 
were systematically violating the rights of millions of innocent 
Jews. Virtually everyone agrees that the Allies’ use of violence 
against the Nazis to bring an end to the Nazis’ heinous, crimi-
nal treatment of innocent Jews was, indeed, warranted. Colb 
and Dorf agree. They acknowledge that there are “times when 
violence may not only be legitimate but may even be morally 
obligatory. We regard the need to stop Hitler to have repre-
sented one such moral imperative” (168).
Some people in the animal rights movement view our cur-
rent wholesale disregard for the rights of animals as the moral 
equivalent of the Nazi Holocaust.8 Colb and Dorf maintain that 
sentient beings have a right to life and a right not to be harmed. 
Since animal agriculture systematically violates these rights, 
Colb and Dorf explore whether it would be morally permis-
sible to use violence to protect the rights of at least some of 
these innocent victims. They “unequivocally and categorically 
oppose violence” in both the animal rights movement and the 
anti-abortion movement. (167) They offer compelling reasons 
for opposing violence directed at abortion providers and for 
opposing violence directed at the perpetrators of animal rights 
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violations (i.e., farmers and slaughterhouse workers). First, 
while it may be true that one can save some particular fetuses 
or animals by an act of violence, there are other particular fe-
tuses or animals that one can save without resorting to vio-
lence. When one can choose between a violent method and an 
equally effective nonviolent method of reducing the number 
of abortions or animal rights violations, there is clear reason 
to prefer the nonviolent method. Second, they offer the conse-
quentialist argument that in the current context violence is un-
likely to be effective at reducing the number of abortions or the 
number of animals victimized by the meat and animal products 
industries, since other providers/producers will simply replace 
any current providers/producers harmed by the violent attack. 
Violence that holds no promise of achieving its stated end is 
both immoral and counterproductive.9
Conclusion
As noted at the outset, Beating Hearts: Abortion and Animal 
Rights is a lively, engaging, and at times, probing and insight-
ful introduction to the central issues in both debates. It would 
be a particularly useful text for helping students to think more 
clearly about the moral status of human fetuses and nonhuman 
animals. 
I should note in closing that none of the criticisms raised here 
affect the soundness of their overarching argument. Regardless 
whether we have positive duties or not, we clearly have a prima 
facie duty not to harm beings capable of being harmed. Since 
sentient fetuses and sentient animals can be harmed, we have a 
corresponding duty not to harm them, absent a compelling rea-
son for doing so. A pregnant woman might have a compelling 
reason to abort a sentient fetus, but there is no compelling rea-
son to kill (or pay others to kill) animals for food, since we can 
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easily meet all of our nutritional needs with a delicious plant-
based diet. Consequently, the book’s central thesis is correct: 
The case for ethical veganism is much stronger than the case 
against abortion (even where sentient fetuses are concerned). 
Indeed, veganism is morally required when plant-based food 
is available.10
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Endnotes
1 For a more detailed commonsense defense of the immorality 
of eating animals, see my “The Commonsense Case for Ethical 
Vegetarianism” Between the Species 19(1): 2-31. 
2 A point acknowledged by Colb and Dorf: “for a woman to 
gestate the pre-sentient fetus past the point of sentience and 
then give birth to the resulting infant is, in an important sense, 
to bestow a gift” (110).
3 According to the Center for Reproductive Rights’s “The 
World’s Abortion Laws Map 2013 Update” Fact Sheet: “Cur-
rently, more than 60% of the world’s population lives in coun-
tries where induced abortion is permitted either for a wide 
range of reasons or without restriction as to reason. In contrast, 
26% of all people reside in countries where abortion is gener-
ally prohibited.”
4 I say, “kill the fetus,” because, according to Colb and Dorf, 
most women who have abortions don’t just want to be free of 
the reproductive servitude, they want the fetus dead. As Colb 
and Dorf put it, most women who have abortions “do not want 
the growing fetus inside them to exist anymore” (88).
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5 They compare an unhappily pregnant woman’s parasitic pre-
dicament to that of a man suffering from a tapeworm that his 
body cannot defeat without intervention. (79)
6 A point first made by Judith Jarvis Thomson in “A Defense 
of Abortion” (1971).
7 Colb and Dorf compare the burden women who are denied 
the right to abortions face with the reproductive servitude in 
which dairy cows and laying hens are held: “In each case, fe-
males’ reproductive capacities are used for the benefit of oth-
ers: abortion prohibitions appropriate the bodies of women for 
the benefit of fetuses; dairy and egg production appropriate the 
bodies of cows and hens for the benefit of the people who will 
eventually eat the dairy and egg products” (77). That the dairy 
and egg industries depend for their existence on the unjust ex-
ploitation of females’ reproductive capacities was first noted 
by Carol Adams (1990). She dubbed egg and dairy products 
“feminized protein” to make visible the hidden female victims 
of these oppressive industries. (1990, 80)
8 The protagonist in Jewish Nobel Laureate Isaac Bashevis Sing-
er’s The Penitent poignantly makes the Nazi comparison as follows: 
 
I had long since come to the conclusion that man’s treatment 
of God’s creatures makes mockery of all his ideals and of the 
whole alleged humanism. In order for this overstuffed individ-
ual to enjoy his ham, a living creature had to be raised, dragged 
to its death, stabbed, tortured, scalded in hot water. The man 
didn’t give a second’s thought to the fact that the pig was made 
of the same stuff as he and that it had to pay with suffering and 
death so that he could taste its flesh. I’ve thought more than once 
that when it comes to animals, every man is a Nazi. (1983, 39) 
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For others who have argued that our current wholesale disre-
gard of the rights of animals is the moral equivalent of the Nazi 
Holocaust, see Bernstein 2004 and Patterson 2002.
9 Peter Singer makes a similar observation in Singer 2011, 274.
10 An early version of this paper was presented in an “Authors 
Meet Critics” celebration at Cornell University Law School. 
I would like to thank Sherry Colb and Michael Dorf for com-
ments on that version. Special thanks to Ramona Ilea for de-
tailed written comments on the penultimate draft. The present 
article is much improved as a result.
